OBMV License Reinstatement Fee Amnesty Chart For Traffic Defense Attorneys

The Ohio Access to Justice Foundation has printed this infographic to explain the OBMV License Reinstatement Fee Debt Reduction and Amnesty Program. Click here DLreinstateInfographic. 

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SPEEDY TRIAL CHEAT SHEET

SPEEDY TRIAL CHEAT SHEET for Criminal Defense Attorneys and Prosecutors.

By Chris Greene, Esq. with assistance from Robert Walton, Esq. (5-11-21)

<span class="entry-utility-prep entry-utility-prep-cat-links">Posted in</span> Criminal, OVI, Traffic | Comments Off on SPEEDY TRIAL CHEAT SHEET

Keeping Clients Informed – Assigned-Counsel Fees

By Shaker Heights Municipal Court Magistrate Anne Walton-Keller

Recently the Supreme Court of Ohio decided that a trial court, pursuant to R.C. 2941.51(D), may order a criminal defendant to pay his or her court-appointed-counsel fees without first articulating explicit findings about the defendant’s ability to pay. State v Taylor, 2020-Ohio-6786. Taylor was ordered to pay $130 to the assigned-counsel-budget fund, which was listed in both “financial obligations” and the “reimbursement payable” sections of Taylor’s sentencing entry, along with the supervision fee and court costs. The case found its way to the Supreme Court of Ohio due to a conflict amongst the appellate districts.

The Court held that the trial court has the authority to impose court-appointed-counsel fees when a defendant reasonably may have the means to pay some part of the cost of the representation provided. The Court also determined that R.C.2941.51(D) does not require the trial court to make explicit findings on the record prior to the assessment of those fees.  The Court explained that the court-appointed-counsel fees cannot be imposed as a part of a defendant’s sentence. However, those fees, if assessed, should be ordered at the time of sentencing and may be listed separately in the sentencing entry as a civil matter.  The Court noted that the best practice is to include such fees in a separate entry. Additionally, court-appointed-counsel fees are not limited to a person convicted of a criminal charge. Rather, they can be imposed regardless of the dispositions of a person’s case.

The trial court in Taylor appropriately assessed the fees at the sentencing hearing but improperly characterized the fees as “financial obligations” and as “reimbursement” in the sentencing entry. Court-appointed-counsel fees cannot be “reimbursement” in the criminal context, because reimbursement refers to “costs.”  See R.C. 2929.18(A)(5)(a). R.C. 2941.51 plainly states that court-appointed-counsel fees shall not be assessed as costs.

Counsel might wish to add the forgoing to the long list of items he or she can inform the client of during the course of representation.  That list includes the effect of a certain plea, the possible consequences of conviction related to non-citizen status, potential penalties, enhancement of punishment or degree of offense for similar offenses, restitution for economic loss, failure to show proof of insurance in a traffic matter, sealing of records, and denial of entry to another country for certain convictions.

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New Edition of the Ohio Driver’s License Reinstatement Handbook

Judge Nicastro and Robert Walton published the 6th Edition of the Ohio Driver’s License Reinstatement Handbook today.  The new edition explains the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles’ permanent debt reduction and amnesty program, omits several repealed suspensions and summarizes some relevant case law.  Although limited, the case law in this area is illuminating.

State v. Caskey, Sixth Dist., Lucas County, 2018-Ohio-116

Caskey filed a petition in a municipal court seeking to vacate a non-compliance suspension and a security suspension arising out of an accident he caused while uninsured. The state filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of the suspensions. The state cited ORC §119.12(A)(1), which provides that “any party adversely affected by an order of an agency. . .suspending a license. . .may appeal the order. . .to the court of common pleas of the county in which . . .the licensee is a resident.” The trial court granted the state’s motion to dismiss and Caskey appealed. The court of appeals correctly stated that ORC §4510.73 was enacted after ORC §119.12, and the grant of concurrent jurisdiction thereunder (to adjudicate all issues and appeals regarding non-commercial driver’s license matters) applies “notwithstanding any provision of the Revised Code to the contrary.” The appeals court determined that the trial court erred in concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellant’s ORC §4510.73 petition and reversed the judgment of dismissal.

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Driving on the Fog Line is Not Reasonable Suspicion for a Traffic Stop

By Magistrate Anne Walton Keller, Shaker Heights Municipal Court

On December 22, 2020 the Supreme Court of Ohio resolved a conflict amongst courts of appeal regarding traffic law by deciding State v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-6773.  The 12th District Court of Appeals certified the issue in conflict as: “Does an officer have a reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a marked lanes violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer observes the tires driving on, but not across a marked lane line?”

Facts and Procedural History

A State Trooper stopped Turner’s car after he observed the right side tires of Turner’s car touch the right fog line. Turner was cited for a marked lanes violation. The Trooper then arrested Turner for OVI. Turner filed a Motion to Suppress on basis that the stop was unlawful. Although the trial court believed the Trooper’s testimony, it granted the Motion to Suppress because touching the lines did not establish a lawful basis for the stop.

The 12th District Court of Appeals reversed. The majority determined that the language of the statute clearly established that a marked lanes violation occurs if a driver is not fully inside or entirely within a single lane of traffic. After holding the Trooper’s suspicion reasonable it declined to address the State’s alternative argument that the stop was lawful because the Trooper made a reasonable mistake of law.

The 12th District certified its judgment as being in conflict with judgments from many other Districts. However, the Supreme Court noted that the only judgments that were in conflict were those which held stops unlawful if a car only drove on or touched a fog line (not over). The Court stated that its holding did not address other types of alleged marked lanes violations such as “centerline” cases.

Holding

Based on language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), the definitions in R.C. 4511.01, and the statutory scheme as whole, the Court held that the single solid white longitudinal line on the right edge of the roadway (fog or edge line) merely discourages or prohibits a driver from crossing it. It does not prohibit driving on or touching it.

The Court reversed the judgment of the 12th District and remanded the case to that court on the issue raised by the State as to whether the trooper reasonably believed that Turner violated the law when he drove on the fog line, making the stop lawful.

Analysis

To resolve the issue the Court turned to statutory construction. In construing a statute a court does not ask what the legislature intended to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no need for a court to apply rules of statutory interpretation.  To determine the plain meaning of a statute, a court relies on definitions provided by the legislature.

R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) is part of a statutory scheme. The meaning of the roadway marking at issue and the movement permitted by that marking, is clear when that statute is considered in the context of the relevant definitions in R.C. 4511.01.

Under R.C. 4511.09, ODOT has authority to adopt a manual for a uniform system of traffic control devices. ODOT adopted the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). R.C. 4511.10 gives ODOT authority to place and maintain traffic control devices conforming to its manual and specifications upon all highways as necessary to indicate and carry out R.C. 4511.01 to 4511.78. Traffic control devices are defined under R.C. 4511.01(QQ) and include markings used to warn or guide traffic. Because the legislature gave ODOT authority to regulate marked lanes of traffic, the Court turned to the MUTCD for guidance. The Court then examined several sections of the MUTCD pertaining to markings, including one that contains a provision that the general function of a solid longitudinal line is to discourage or prohibit crossing.

R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) provides that “whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic…a vehicle shall be driven, as nearly as practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic…” The road markings, as set forth in the MUTCD, define the bounds of the clearly marked lanes. The Court stated that under the MUTCD, a standard marking can be used only to convey the meaning prescribed for that marking in the MUTCD. In the instant case, the single solid white longitudinal line as used on this two-lane, two-way highway served only to mark the right-hand edge of the road and that marking only discourages or prohibits crossing it, not driving on it.  Therefore, Turner’s touching of the fog line was not a marked lanes violation.

As to other types of alleged “clearly marked lanes violations,” it appears that the same analysis will be utilized.

 

 

<span class="entry-utility-prep entry-utility-prep-cat-links">Posted in</span> Traffic | Comments Off on Driving on the Fog Line is Not Reasonable Suspicion for a Traffic Stop