Lange v. California: “No Categorical Warrantless Search Exception” Where Misdemeanant Flees into Home

By Robert G. Walton Esquire and Danielle Muster, his law clerk.

On June 23, 2021, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision in Lange v. California, 594 U. S. ____(2021). The principal issue was whether the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect categorically qualifies as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a home. In the opinion written by Justice Kagan, the Court held that under the Fourth Amendment, pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always—that is, categorically—justify a warrantless entry into a home.

Arthur Lange was driving in Sonoma, California and drove past a California state highway patrol officer. Lange’s windows were rolled down and music was blasting from his car as he repeatedly honked his horn. As Justice Kagan wrote, “it is fair to say, [he] was asking for attention.” The officer began following Lange and quickly turned on his overhead lights, indicating that Lange should pull over. However, Lange knew his house was only 100 yards away (or a four-second drive), so instead of stopping, he continued to his driveway and entered his attached garage. The officer pursued him, entered Lange’s garage and began questioning him. At that point he observed signs of intoxication and administered field sobriety tests. Lange performed poorly on the field sobriety tests and submitted to a breath test which evidenced a BAC more than three times the legal limit.

Lange was charged with the misdemeanor of driving under the influence of alcohol and a (lower-level) noise infraction. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the officer entered his garage, arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. All of the California courts applied a categorical rule that because the officer was in hot pursuit of a misdemeanor suspect, the officer’s warrantless entry into the suspect’s garage was lawful. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of whether the Fourth Amendment always permits an officer to enter a home without a warrant in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect.

The Court began its analysis by reviewing the Fourth Amendment: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” This standard generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant before a law enforcement officer can enter a home without permission. Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 382 (2014). However, the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. One of the most common exceptions to the warrant requirement is exigent circumstances and it applies when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 ( 2011 ) at 460. The United States Supreme Court has generally applied the exigent circumstances exception on a case by case basis. The exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.

The police may make a warrantless entry to “prevent the imminent destruction of evidence” or to “prevent a suspect’s escape,” which is commonly referred to as the fleeing-felon exception, or a category of exigent circumstances. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 ( 2006 ) at 403; Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91, 100 (1990). An officer may also enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant, to protect an occupant from imminent injury, or to ensure his own safety. In those circumstances the delay required to obtain a warrant would bring about some real immediate and serious consequences, and such exigencies permit a warrantless entry into a home.

However, the United States Supreme Court has not recognized a fleeing-misdemeanor category to the exigent circumstance’s exception. Under the Fourth Amendment one’s home is protected and the Court has said that the Amendment, at its very core, “stands for the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.” Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S. ___. (2018). The Lange Court stated that is not eager to “print a new permission slip for entering the home without a warrant.” An even more compelling reason not to allow a categorical fleeing-misdemeanor exception is the way misdemeanors vary widely in all 50 states. The Court has held that when only a minor offense alone is involved, police officers do not usually face the kind of emergency that can justify a warrantless home entry. The Court acknowledges that a suspect’s flight adds to the circumstances of a need to enter a home without a warrant. However, there is no evidence that every case of misdemeanor flight poses the same dangers that a fleeing felon might create and misdemeanor flight does not always supply the exigency that is demanded for a warrantless home entry.

The Court also analyzed common-law principles, which did not recognize a categorical rule allowing warrantless home entries in every case of misdemeanor hot pursuit. There was, however, an exception for an officer to enter a house to pursue a felon. The common law did not support a categorical rule allowing warrantless home entry when a misdemeanant flees; instead, it was dependent on the facts- whether there was a potential for harm and a need to act promptly.

Based on its analysis, the Court in Lange concluded that the flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home. When the officer has time to get a warrant, even when dealing with a fleeing misdemeanor suspect, the officer must do so. These types of cases must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and the Court declined to approve a categorical rule. Thus, the Court vacated the decision of the California Court of Appeals (which had applied a categorical rule) and remanded the case.

Previously, in Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St. 3d 43 (2002) the Supreme Court of Ohio had held that when officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is being arrested is a misdemeanor without violating the Fourth Amendment. The decision in Lange makes it clear that a categorical rule allowing warrantless home entries by a police officer in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant is an inappropriate way to analyze whether a warrant is required in such a case. Going forward, courts must examine whether exigent circumstances in hot pursuit cases justify a warrantless home entry on a case by case basis.

<span class="entry-utility-prep entry-utility-prep-cat-links">Posted in</span> General, Search & Seizure, Traffic | Comments Off on Lange v. California: “No Categorical Warrantless Search Exception” Where Misdemeanant Flees into Home

OBMV License Reinstatement Fee Amnesty Chart For Traffic Defense Attorneys

The Ohio Access to Justice Foundation has printed this infographic to explain the OBMV License Reinstatement Fee Debt Reduction and Amnesty Program. Click here DLreinstateInfographic. 

<span class="entry-utility-prep entry-utility-prep-cat-links">Posted in</span> Traffic | Comments Off on OBMV License Reinstatement Fee Amnesty Chart For Traffic Defense Attorneys

SPEEDY TRIAL CHEAT SHEET

SPEEDY TRIAL CHEAT SHEET for Criminal Defense Attorneys and Prosecutors.

By Chris Greene, Esq. with assistance from Robert Walton, Esq. (5-11-21)

<span class="entry-utility-prep entry-utility-prep-cat-links">Posted in</span> Criminal, OVI, Traffic | Comments Off on SPEEDY TRIAL CHEAT SHEET

Keeping Clients Informed – Assigned-Counsel Fees

By Shaker Heights Municipal Court Magistrate Anne Walton-Keller

Recently the Supreme Court of Ohio decided that a trial court, pursuant to R.C. 2941.51(D), may order a criminal defendant to pay his or her court-appointed-counsel fees without first articulating explicit findings about the defendant’s ability to pay. State v Taylor, 2020-Ohio-6786. Taylor was ordered to pay $130 to the assigned-counsel-budget fund, which was listed in both “financial obligations” and the “reimbursement payable” sections of Taylor’s sentencing entry, along with the supervision fee and court costs. The case found its way to the Supreme Court of Ohio due to a conflict amongst the appellate districts.

The Court held that the trial court has the authority to impose court-appointed-counsel fees when a defendant reasonably may have the means to pay some part of the cost of the representation provided. The Court also determined that R.C.2941.51(D) does not require the trial court to make explicit findings on the record prior to the assessment of those fees.  The Court explained that the court-appointed-counsel fees cannot be imposed as a part of a defendant’s sentence. However, those fees, if assessed, should be ordered at the time of sentencing and may be listed separately in the sentencing entry as a civil matter.  The Court noted that the best practice is to include such fees in a separate entry. Additionally, court-appointed-counsel fees are not limited to a person convicted of a criminal charge. Rather, they can be imposed regardless of the dispositions of a person’s case.

The trial court in Taylor appropriately assessed the fees at the sentencing hearing but improperly characterized the fees as “financial obligations” and as “reimbursement” in the sentencing entry. Court-appointed-counsel fees cannot be “reimbursement” in the criminal context, because reimbursement refers to “costs.”  See R.C. 2929.18(A)(5)(a). R.C. 2941.51 plainly states that court-appointed-counsel fees shall not be assessed as costs.

Counsel might wish to add the forgoing to the long list of items he or she can inform the client of during the course of representation.  That list includes the effect of a certain plea, the possible consequences of conviction related to non-citizen status, potential penalties, enhancement of punishment or degree of offense for similar offenses, restitution for economic loss, failure to show proof of insurance in a traffic matter, sealing of records, and denial of entry to another country for certain convictions.

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New Edition of the Ohio Driver’s License Reinstatement Handbook

Judge Nicastro and Robert Walton published the 6th Edition of the Ohio Driver’s License Reinstatement Handbook today.  The new edition explains the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles’ permanent debt reduction and amnesty program, omits several repealed suspensions and summarizes some relevant case law.  Although limited, the case law in this area is illuminating.

State v. Caskey, Sixth Dist., Lucas County, 2018-Ohio-116

Caskey filed a petition in a municipal court seeking to vacate a non-compliance suspension and a security suspension arising out of an accident he caused while uninsured. The state filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of the suspensions. The state cited ORC §119.12(A)(1), which provides that “any party adversely affected by an order of an agency. . .suspending a license. . .may appeal the order. . .to the court of common pleas of the county in which . . .the licensee is a resident.” The trial court granted the state’s motion to dismiss and Caskey appealed. The court of appeals correctly stated that ORC §4510.73 was enacted after ORC §119.12, and the grant of concurrent jurisdiction thereunder (to adjudicate all issues and appeals regarding non-commercial driver’s license matters) applies “notwithstanding any provision of the Revised Code to the contrary.” The appeals court determined that the trial court erred in concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellant’s ORC §4510.73 petition and reversed the judgment of dismissal.

<span class="entry-utility-prep entry-utility-prep-cat-links">Posted in</span> License Reinstatement | Comments Off on New Edition of the Ohio Driver’s License Reinstatement Handbook